Faith And Thought

We may behave as if we were criticising the existence of God, or even the nature of his existence and even his nature as a person, but this is probably only an inadequate idea. The conditions of permissible faith and venture do not exclude faith in God, for God is a man, not a God of flesh and blood, a man.
This understanding of what faith is could motivate us to be more open – more open to the kind of faith that is expressed in religious belief. We start from a functioning understanding of the theistic tradition to which we belong and use it as a basis for our faith in the existence of God. According to theistic traditions, belief in God is sustained not only by those who hold fast to it, but also by those who do not.
Philosophical representations of the theistic faith, however, typically focus on the question of whether there is a single person of faith or a person without faith. Muyskens juxtaposes hope with the understanding of faith as faith, arguing that the religion of hope is epistemically and religiously superior to the religions of faith, and vice versa.
A model of faith based on hope ignores that affective certainty that is widely regarded as characteristic of faith, and faith is not generally understood as competing with hope. A more adequate model of faith and hope, therefore, might be more likely to lead to the realization of faith by hoping that the claims of faith are true. Since Pojman (1986) and 2003, philosophers have equated faith with hope, but faith has not generally been understood as competing hope for the assertion that it is true, or even an act of hope in itself.
This assumption will lead those who believe that theological claims cannot be reasonably accepted without evidence to regard faith as a degenerative research program. If one assumes that faith consists of the belief that a theological proposition is true, then this model suggests the assumption that all theological convictions belong to the same category as scientific and theoretical hypotheses with which they compete accordingly. This model, therefore, rejects the specific knowledge of its theological content found in some theistic religious traditions, and thus rejects a more appropriate model of faith and hope, which could also be found elsewhere. We consider a special knowledge of the theological contents of our model essential to make theistic faith a faith.
On the contrary, we assume that all scientific and secular knowledge and assertions are based on a special knowledge of their theological content. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of the religious faith presented in the writings of theologians such as Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin is that it is based on indisputable assertions. It is not uncommon to hear this occupation as a belief claim in a religious belief system, or even as an argument against the existence of such a belief.
Modernity, which presents truth through science, has room only for a supernatural God, but only in the form of a “naturalistic” God.
The logical conclusion, then, is that God and science are contradictory, and this is where the relationship between faith and reason (and between science and faith) develops. There is a historical and flawed process that has altered human understanding of faith – and reason – making them seem strange to one another. Since science has become the new name of reason, faith and reason have been at odds for centuries in the modern world.
We see traditions filled with rationality threatened by violence, and faith offers a lifesaving, if problematic, response. The logo implies the birth and death of the Christian God, but we see tradition as rationality and threatening forces, faith as life-saving and problematic answers.
Altogether Smith offers the interested reader a good overview of the history of philosophy as well as some interesting insights into the philosophy of religion. First, the degree of universality with which Smith examines the arguments for and against the figures under discussion is likely to leave many historians of philosophy dissatisfied.
We know that philosophy and religion are perfectly compatible; after all, some of the greatest philosophers were also great men of faith. Second, historians of these ideas overlook the fact that society was born and influenced not only by the philosophy of religion, but also by other religions such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and even Benedictine Christianity.
In any case, the link between faith and philosophical activity is quite strong, and as Joel Marks points out in his article, this is not because there are many people who are simply religious, in their spare time, so to speak. The strength of the links between philosophy and religion is hardly surprising. As with religion, philosophy is also a way of claiming to have something to say about all aspects of life. Thus philosophers often philosophize about the claims of religion and the implications of these claims.